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1.' THE POSITION OF IHE BANKING BUSINESS 
The banking business in China has been circumscribed 
by various restrictions of an outward nature, but its special 
handicap consisted in the, absence of close relations with 
industry which might have formed its foundation. If, we 
should take up the central mechanism of financial adjustment, 
. we shall find that there was pressure from the upper pait, 
while the ordinary commercial banks in the lower part were 
out of the pale of control by this mechanism. Moreover, 
on the side of this central mechanism, the movement of the 
, special banks had failed to form a close organic constitution. 
Nor is it necessary to dwell at length on the financial control 
which has been brought to bear upon the Chinese banking 
business from the foreign Powers. The inter· relations be-
tween the. prices of silver and the Chinese financial panics 
up to the year 1932 was a phenomenon which was an object 
of worldwide attention. Howe,(er, the movement of the 
Chinese banking activities at this period was characterized 
by much briskness though it was in a malformed' condition. 
After" this period the world depresion extended to China, and 
the Chinese financial world came to be faced by a tendency 
of depression. Moreover, there was a series of natural cala· 
mities and other unfortunate consequences including the 
Manchuria Incident and the First Shanghai Affair, aU of 
which gravely affected Chinese national economy. It might 
be said .that under such. a period of serious events, the 
development of the Chinese banking business was impossible. 
'However, in reality, this was not the case. No decline was 
seen in "the banking activities and there was the curious 
phenomonon of an increase in the number of Chinese banks. 
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In the absence of exact figures indicating such a trend of 
'the Chinese banking business, I shall give the following 
table. of figures to make a rough estimation of ,the tendency 
under consideration. The number of newly established banks 
continued to show yearly increases even after' 1932, the 
number in 1934 being 20. The following table gives a number 
of figures around these years.') 
Number of Banks Classified by the Years of Establishment. 
Year Number Year Number 
1931 15 1936 5 
1932 14 1937 3 
1933 16 1938 1 
1934- 20 1939 2 
1935 8 1940 11 
.. There -are several reasons for- the foregoing statistical 
_ figures as provided by Chinese papers which I shall enu-
merate as follows. First, after the year 1932 or the 21st year 
of the birth of the Chinese Republic, domestic bonds continued 
to be. issued, the amount of loans extended to the Chinese 
Government by the banks was extremely large and at least 
one half of the domestic bonds issued were in the hands of 
the banks. Thus, the banks had a way of profit-making in 
political investments, and in consequence they escaped faIl-
ing into depression along with ,the commercial and, industrial 
decline., Secondly" during several years at this time banking 
capital had closer relations with the finance of the Central 
Government, while its connections with the local finance of 
provinci~l- governments also became increasingly closer. 
Local finance had its revenue reduced. due to agricultural 
bankruptcy, on one hand; while its expenditure grew larger 
and larger in connection with the subjugation of bandits, the. 
repairing ·of highways and the· relief of the victims of cala-
1) : The Organization and. Business of the_ Chinese Banks, Economic Reserch, 
Vol 2, No.8, pp. 30-31. 
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mities. The authorities of provinCial governments thus had 
to -go to Shanghai in order to make both. ends meet and 
. relieve their financial distress. They also issued local bonds, 
established highways, built" warehouses and iiI an extre~e 
case divided their current political expenses, and on each 
occasion they had to go to Shanghai to get their needed 
funds. Thus, the banks in Shanghai found an outlet for 
their capital. Thirdly, the fact that the banks were able to 
make a normal development during several years when the 
lime under study had a close connection with the general' 
decline of the" chien chwang" (~Jljlf.) or the native-style banks. 
The native-style banks began to regain their lost power by 
the first year of the Chinese Republican Era, 1912. Prior to 
1932 these native-style banks had managed their enterprises 
in cooperation with the banks of foreign nationalities, on one 
hand, and by utilizing the idle capital of the foreign-style 
domestic banks; and they proved to have a powerful existence. 
But after"'1932 their, decline became manifest in every turn. 
The native-style ,banks in the interior regions had much . 
difficulty because of the collapse of agrarian economy and 
the successive downfall of commerce and industry. '-The depo-
sits of these banks decreased steadily while the collection of 
their loans became increasingly difficult. Moreover, after 
1932 the foreign·sty.1e Chinese banks in Shanghai tightened 
their' purse string against the native-style banks in the in-
terior regions. Thus the latter became hard pressed from 
both sides;' and they had to tread a general road of decline_ 
.This decline had its effect on the native·style banks in citi~s. 
Thus, the entire native'style banking business was thrown 
into a whirlpool of panic during~ sevEral years at that time 
and their salvation seEmed out of the qUestion. Because 
of this general decline of the native-style banks in the 
interior rEgions, the foreign st¥le banks were able to make 
their normal development in the "interior. This state of 
affairs will become clear when the fact is taken into con-
sideration that prior to the Second Shanghai Affair, the 
foreign-style banks rapidly established new branches in the 
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'interior regions and' their number increased abruptly.') 
Now, even' supposing that the foregoing, reas'ons given 
from the Chinese sources prove the fact that the foreign-style 
Chinese banks did not fall. into depression during the period 
under consideration, these' show, with the exception of the 
banks' replacement ofthe Chinese native-style banks, that this 
did not take place in the general trend which these banks from 
their inherent nature should have travelled. Nor can their 
replacement of the" chien chwang" be said to have always 
ushered in a closer relationship -between the banking business 
and industry. Primarily, the progress of the banking busi-
ness in Chinese economy has been characterized by a mal-
formed condition and because of their malformed transition 
they lacked a firm foundation .. However; t,his does not 
mean that because .of this the position of· the banks became 
weak. Superficially, the banks were apparently weak in' both 
their business and organization. They possessed ~he nature 
of commercial banks in their malformed transition and they 
were engrossed in the activity of comlllercial depositing' 
which is 110t the inherent function of banking organs. Despite 
these weaknesses and discrepancies, the foreign-style Chinese 
banks never had a weak existence as financial organs. On the 
contrary, they maintained a predominant position in Chinese 
national economy. Moreover, the "chien chwang" and 
other traditional Chinese financial organs as well as the banks 
of foreign nationalities seem to have been opposed to the 
foreign-style banks, but in reality they had close ties with 
the last named in personal and territorial relations. Moreover, 
the Government had very close relations--"'ith these foreign- / 
style or new banks through its bond policy because of its 
financial distress.' Because of the failure of making a proper 
adjustment in the banking system, these banks did not tread 
the sane course as commercial banks; but as ordinary com-
mercial banks they occupied a powerful position. Und~r the 
China Affair, too, these banks suffered a considerable setback 
2) Op. cit. Vol. 2, No.8, p. ~8. 
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but have succeeded in maintaining their integral pOSition. 
However, 'the time h!ls arrived 'when these banks must cast 
off their malformed character· in substance, although they 
may continue to show their traditional·. tendencies in their 
outward appearances. 
The -position of the. Chinese banking business· was, in 
actuality, characterized by firmness which, however, was in 
a malformed condition in its nature as has been exemplified 
in the. foregoing account.. The development of the Chinese 
banking business· was unbalanced, because it had no firm 
foundation for its business affairs and was devoid of a 
precise system in its organization. It was the regret of the 
Chinese themselves that these shortcomings formed shoals 
for the future development of their banking business.') That 
the Chinese banking business had no firm foundation in its 
business activities may be referred from the fact that there 
was no close relationship between finance and industry in 
. its business conditions. However, the fact that the absence· 
of such close reilitions between· finance and industry was no 
proof for the weak condition of finance, as has been demon· 
strated in the foregoing examples. The fact that the banking 
business .had no solid system in its organization may not 
have weakened its position, but at least it made. the Chinese; . 
banking system avery loose organization. Formally, different 
classes of· banks may have enjoyed their nominal existence 
indicating their respective missions, but their condition was 
not normal in the absence of a mechanism with the central 
bank as its financial centre. However, this did not mean 
actual weakness in practice. 
In the spring of 1935, the former Nationalist Govern·. 
ment, prior to its currency reform, had already commenced 
its financial control and declared its intention to carry out 
a general adjustment of the financial mechanism in its pro· 
posed currency reform. The effects of the currency reform 
, . 
3) The Economic Re~arch ,Laboratory of the Bank of China,. National Bank-
ing Yearbook (1937), Chapt. 1, p. 59. 
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both in its causes and effects registered an epoch-making 
stage in the Chinese financial and monetary world. Apositive 
development in the financial mechanism was seen in various 
respects :-in the consolidation of the central financial mecha-
nism, in the control of local finance and in dealing with 
ordinary commercial banks. My present article deals with 
the problems of the ordinary banking business in the territory 
of China now under construction. 
2. THE BASIS OF THE BANKING BUSINESS 
CONDITION 
. . No exception, of course, should be expected of China's 
case in the application of the general truth that there should 
pe a close relationship between finance and· industry, if the 
former is to make a sane development. From the early times, 
the role to be played by Chinese finance had been recognized 
. from the necessity of the economic construction of China. 
However, neither domestic capital nor foreign capital could 
meet the demand of Chinese finance in carrying out that role. 
While in the case of the advance· into China of foreign 
capital, such a sweeping statement is rather irrelevant, there 
were points worthy of a close scrutiny in the attitude of the 
Chinese in receiving' foreign capital as well as in the chara-
cter of investments by the foreign Powers.')" At any rate, 
. great was the significance of the establishment of a closer 
relationship between finance and industry as a result of the 
currency reform of China. Although we are thus constrain: 
ed to recognize the role of the currency reform in this 
respect, it could not get on its right track by itself alone. 
I shall take up the tendencies in Chinese economy along this 
line by citing from Chinese sources.") 
. ~ 
4) Li Ming, The Economic Policy of Present· Day China, International Review; 
Vol. 4, N~. 4. -
5) Chen Chia Tsun: Das chinesische Bankwesen, 1939, SS. 98-98 .. 
6) A Birds-Eye View of China's Wartime Finance Policy, Economic Resear-ch, 
Vol. 2, No.8, p. 20. 
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In China, a measure of success was achieved in the 
various, branches of economy only after her currency 
reform, and there appeared signs of prosperity for national 
economy. In examining the process of the development of 
Chinese finance, therefore, one should first direct one's 
study to China's general economic phenomena, particularly 
the transformation in her industrial world, in order to pass' 
'one's unclouded judgment. This is because finance and 
industry are in inseparable 'relations. In other words, 
finance depends on industrial protection, while industrial 
development is also dependent on the appropriate adjust-
ment of finallce. In recent rears in China, the Government 
by its positive construction program' has succeeded in 
bringing in a gradual prosperity to its commerce and in-
dustry, and has thereby ushered in the 'present form of 
capitalistic system, which now points to their future course 
of progress. Therefore, Chinese finance at present no 
longer forms the relations of general financial transactions 
. and adjustment by means of individual credit. On the:. 
,contrary, it is destined to assist considerably the develop-
mentof industry in general' and to bring about th~ ac-
cumulation of capital. On the. other hand, the credit system 
will be established by means of this accumulated 'capital / . 
in order to assure its steady operation and thereby assist 
in introducing the prosperity of Chinese national economy. 
Such, indeed, are the views expressed by Chinese writers 
on economy in that country. ' In reality, however, although 
demand for the establishment of a closer relationship between 
finance and industry in China has been felt for a long period 
of time, it has remained unrealized. Even after the outbreak 
of the China Incident, Chinese finance was unable to attain 
its desired object of maintaining close relations with com-
merce and industry. During the China InCident, Chinese 
finance seemed to have enjoyed a prosperity at least in its 
external aspect, but this was a malformed prosperity as it 
bristled with speculative buying and storing. This, indeed 
is a matter of general knowledge. One of the problems of 
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wartime finance not only in China but in alI other countries 
·"as welI,is how to operate short·time cJ.lrrentdeposits as 
long·time fixed -loans. Consideration should be given not only 
. to this problem of the mission of 'credit medium, but also to 
the role of cr-eating credit itself. - In China however, there 
is a circumstance which makes these activities difficult of 
speedy actualization. Generally speaking, credit·medium in 
the case of commercial capital is apt to have the character 
of a usuary commercial capital, while it has not yet attained 
the status of industrial capital. It was premature for China 
to have any system of credit creation with a normal charac· 
ter. In the past when there was no unification of ·banknotes 
issued, there was ample room for reflection concerning the 
creation of credit, pnd the expansion of credit loans under -
the old system should be given a'deep consideration from the 
creation of credit. Thus, the financial business was in such 
a condition -in the past that it could not function sanely or 
extensively in either receiving deposits or extending its loans. 
Its business activities were marked by unsoundness and 
narrowness. Moreover, increases made in the bank deposits 
under the China Incident were not those in fixed deposits 
but in current deposits. Although -the incre~sing proportion 
of current deposits "as compared with fixed deposits is a 
general phenomenon during wartime conditions anywhere, it 
goes without saying that it is contrary to the object of war· 
time finance. _ As to the problems of bank notes they are to 
be settled following the currency unification,' while the -evils 
bound up with credit loaning should be speedily dealt with. 
3. THE TENDENCY OF THE -BANKING BUSINESS 
. There are several viewpoints in _ taking up the proolem 
of changes in the amounts of increases and decreases of 
deposits and loans in the Chinese banking business under 
the China Incident. - Both China under new construction and 
China in opposition to Japan alike desire the establishment .. 
of a new wartime financial organization, because both have 
the same circumstances demanding such a financial orgariiza· 
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tion. In the districts under new construction, it was unavoid· 
able that there was a temporary suspension of all commer· 
cial and industrial activities following military disturbances .. 
Norcdid the territorY under the Chiang Kai·shekregime have 
the foundation of its commercial and industrial enterprises, 
although there was the proposal of the Hsinan (i!!i]fi) invest-
ment. During. this abnormal period, it is natural that the 
increases in bank deposits should be made only in current 
deposits, while the amount of long·term fixed deposits should 
steadily dwindle. This was the case with China .. Reports 
made of eleven banks in Shanghai indicate that the percentage 
of fixed deposits before the China Incident was 60 per cent 
of the total deposits and it went down to 20 per cent after 
the outbreak of the incident. Conversely, the percentage of 
current deposits increased from 40 per cent to SOper cent 
in the same period.') No parallel changes· took place for 
current loans. Both fixed deposits and fixed loans· alike 
, decreased in amount. However, different phenomena are seen 
in the case of the Bank of China ('i'liI'JiiHt).') The percentage 
of its deposits and loans being as stated in later pages. 
Immediately after' the China Incident, a temporary' de-
crease· of bank deposits was expected because of the. with-
drawal of deposits arid the flight of capital. However, the 
strained financial condition was quickly met with by the 
various measures of financial exigency and the following acts 
brought about the increases of bank deposits and the speedy 
expansion of current deposits in particular :-the bringing-in 
of money by refugees upon their return, the progress of the 
financial organs of the war districts, the bringing-in of hoarded 
fapi ($;:'11:), the arrival of North China capital, and partial 
return of foreign capital from the places of its flight. This 
. was particularly the case in Shanghai where the deposits of 
7) The Past~and Present of the Chinese Commercial Rmks, Bank Weekly, ." 
Vol. 27, No. 13-14, p. 2. 
8) The Organization and Business of the Chinese Banks, Economic Research, 
Vol. 2, No.8, p: 46. 
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banks increased rather than decreased .as compared with the 
conditions before the incident, because of the concentration 
there of idle capital from various parts of the country. 
This increase in· the amount of deposits was due to the 
causes already stated and was not due to the creation of 
credit through the function of banks. Granting that it was 
made through the credit medium of banks, it was occasioned 
by the factor of un stability coming from the entrusting in 
partial agency of the expanded volume of currency. Thus, 
this increase was made in the amount of current deposits 
instead of fixed deposits. In actuality, the amount of current 
deposits was the largest, followed by that of fixed current 
deposits and that of fixed d~posits was the. least-a phenome· 
. non which was far from being consonant with the needs and 
demands of economic construction.") This series of financial 
phenomena in the case of China should 'not be construed as 
events of process prior to the attainment of the inherent 
object of the commercial banks; but rather it should be con· 
sidered as being adverse to such a process of attainment, 
b~cause of the conditions -of Chinese finance at that tfme. 
After the enforcement of the new monetary policy, control 
in the financial activities .was augmented and the concentra· 
tion of the right· of currency issue in the hands of such large 
banks as the Central Bank of China (ll'1~<1Ht), the Bank of 
China (q'i"ll:l<1tl, the Bank of Communications (",iIDl:I<1tl, and 
the Farmers' Bank of China (NMIlIH~l:I<1tl. had remarkably 
restricted the field of so·called creating credit by commercial 
banks. Thus, the increase in their deposits after the outbreak 
of the China Incident was made under this restriction. Nor 
were· these deposits made for investment by the people; 
they merely were 'the surplus currency of idle capital and 
were stored by the commercial banks. because of the absence 
of a proper outlet of their .investment. Surplus capital 
would heighten' the degree of being absorbed by bank 
deposits when the rate of interest is high. But so long as 
9) op. cit. Economic Research. Vol. 2. No.8, p. 54. 
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it is unable to find a.n outlet for loans. it would overcome 
its limitations comparatively quickly for absorbing surplus 
capital by raising deposit rates - control\ing speculative 
activities. The raising of interest rate is effective in provid-
ing against the unstability of fluctuations in the amounts of 
the deposits· of ordinary commercial banks, for increasing 
the amount of deposit reserves as wel\ as in preventing the· . 
intensification of the· tendency of investment in goods and 
al\ acts of speculative buying. However, it cannot surpass 
its natural Iimitations.1O) -
Now, if the volume of deposits is increased and there is 
no. corre5ponding outlet for loans, wbat would become of the 
money received? yve are natural\y faced with this query. 
The first phenomenon we confront is that the amount of 
deposit reserves for each bank will expand as a result of the 
increase of deposits and the reduction of loans. This expan-
sion is forcibly expressed as an increase in the cal\ loan 
. and indicates the difficulty for bank capital to find an outlet 
for its loans as wel\ as its functional limitations .. Receiving 
deposits is necessary as a role of providing reserve money, 
apart from the difficulty of finding an outlet for surplus 
deposits, in order to provide against. the unstability of fluctua- -
tions of deposits.") Secondly. the volume of negotiable bills 
for al\ banks has invariably increased. This is because of 
the' accepted idea in China that buying bonds is a most 
profitable' enterprise. This, of course. does not mean the 
sane digestion of bonds but comes from its character as a 
sort of pressure and speculation in the financial world of 
China. While loans are difficult to withdraw in a single 
moment. it is easy in the case of government bonds which 
are not very risky. Here is then an outlet for bank deposits. 
Although investment in government bonds is also speculative. 
it is a healthier outlet for bank deposits than investment in 
buildings and' real estate, because while the latter investment 
10) op. cit. Bank Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 13, 14, p. 2. 
11) op. cit. Economic Rese.rch. VoL I, No.8, p. 48. 
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is liable to deadlock, .the former investment enjoys flexibility" 
and is an outlet of some merit." In addition to government 
bonds, the amount of other negotiable securities has increased, 
indicating another outlet for deposit increases. l2) In thi:> 
connection, it may ·be stated that there have been no marked 
changes in the investment of banks in builtlings and real 
estate, which is said to be a. character.istic of Chinese com· 
mercial banks. 
In view of the fact that the sphere of the Chinese banks 
under the wartime conditions was in the war areas, great 
business losses might be supposed. In reality, however, 
the effect of this was so light that they had only the rate of 
their profit·making somewhat reduced. Moreover, some of 
those banks which had been complaining of heavy losses 
made some" improvement in their" business conditions.'" 
Although. the interest rate per diem (about four per cent) 
of, current loans -is very. low, the payment of interest and 
tightne,ss in the operation of deposits are causes for reduc· 
tions "in "" the yieldings of the banks. Since the rate of 
interest for fixed deposits is high (being about 8-9 per cent), 
it tends to add to the burden of the banks; and unless an 
outlet is opened for the use of fixed deposits, their" increase 
would reduce the yieldings of the banks.·" It is unthinkable, 
however, that, because of this, banks avoided to receive 
fixed deposits. The banks must have been hit by the hos· 
tilities at least" to some extent, and ther"e must be some 
reasons why the banks managed to earn 'yieldings though in 
reduced rates. _ The reasons are not far to seek. The banks,_ 
took up the business of exchange which is not their inherent 
function. They carried on the transactions of foreign ex· 
changes and made speculative investments in various goods. 
They also gave loans with such goods a securities and were 
engaged in the transactions of various securities. A close 
12) op. cit. Economic Research. Vol. 2. No.8. p. 50. 
13) Further consideration is necessary for the' ~eductiori of, financial power~ 
op. cit.Baqk Weekly. Vol. 27, No. 13-14, p. 2. 
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<examination of these activities of the banks should be under-
taken. I have made such a study elsewhere.") 
The financial movemerit in wartime conditions that 
should be taken from the standpoint of positive construction 
is the establish~~nt of new financial organs in the districts 
·of construction; and their adjustment. In the districts under 
the control of Chiang Kai-shek, there were proposals for the 
establishment of branches for provincial, municipal banks 
as well as agricultural and industrial banks, but conditions 
for the investment of capital were not ripe'for any of them.") 
I have above explained the' phenOinenon of the increases 
made in the amount of bank· deposits dUring the China In-
cident. I shall now take up the loans made by eight com-
mercial and-savings banks in addition to their deposits. The-
loans· have also shown increases as the following table 
. indicates.")17) 
The Deposits and Loans of Chinese Banks 
(1936-1938 in Yuan) 
1936 1937 
Deposit!l 1,417,264,428 1,506,120,755 




The' foregoing table shows that the total amount of bank 
deposits increased from _ 1,400,000,000 yuan in -lQ-36 .to 
1,900,000,000 yuan in 1938, while that of bank loans increased 
from 1,100,000,000 yuan in 1936 to 1,600,000,000 yuanjn 1938. 
A specially large increase was made"between the year 1937 
and 1938 in the amount of hank loans. Normally, it appears 
impossible to find causes for' the increaee of bond loans and 
such an increase may be considered as a partial treatment 
of figures. However, it is necessary to analyze the 'causes 
14) op. cit. Economic Research, Vol. 2, No, 8, p. 54 
15) Cheng Mo-chieh, Banking Conditions in Wartime China, Financial Review, 
Vol. 1, No.1, 1'. 170, pp. 178-179. 
16) The Financial Research Society. Chinese Finance and Financial Organs 
und~r the China Incident, p. 101. 
17) op. cit. Economic Research, Vol. 2, No.8, pp. 46-48. 
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of this increase.' It is said that in wartime the business 
of making loans by the banks would become a loosing busi-
ness activity. But in China this does not mean that this 
, business of making loans in the past has· been healthy and' 
profitable. Moreover, in wartime the. activities of spe-
culative business will become more delicate than hitherto . 
. It ,behooves the Chinese banking business to detach itself 
from its specul!ltive' activities as far as possible under the 
existing wartime condition,S, especially because of various 
issues which are bound up with financial control required 
by the wartime exigencies. 
It is not impossible to regard the increase in the amount 
of bank loans side by side with bank deposits; as, an advance 
towards the creation of, their credit although the object of 
such 10;;J.ns has been speculation, because such loans tend. to' 
. - '" -', . 
maintain a balance in the business conditions of banks . 
. However, it should be noted that the abnormal financial 
.power of commercial banks is bound to undergo a,. deCline 
with the increasing activities of semi-government banks such 
as the Federal System of Four Banks (mHTl\IIiil'mljl:It~.It)' in the 
districts under the sway of Chiang Kai-shek and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of China ('i'fllll\lliil'l\'!1iIII.I!lff) and the Central Re-
. serve Bank of China ('i'!h1lll1illl£Uff) both in the district under 
construction, the former in North China and the latter. in . 
Central China. Such a destiny of the commercial banks is 
not -a result of the China Incident but rather is a natural 
outcome of the improvement of the banj{s which have held 
their financial power in their malformed condition. However, 
affairs which have been concomitant on the China Incident 
such as the accomodation of war expenses, the expansion' of 
productive power and the expansion of currencies and the 
like had the effect. of reducing the activities of the com-
mercial banks. Their sphere of activities has been also nar-
rowed by speculative acts through agencie!l other than the 
commercial banks themselves. Generally -speaking, com-
mercial banks under financial' control do FlOt usually lose' 
their financial power because of. their being such banks. In 
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the case of China, however, -the commercial banks came to 
expose their weaknesses on account... of their backwardness 
when the pressure of control by the currency reform .and 
wartime- economy was brought to bear upon them. The" 
adjustment of the business activities of the ordinary com-
mercial Danks has been made along the line of advance 
of the old function of credit loans to loans on bills.'B)- It is 
true that the. adjustment of ordinary commercial banks gjves 
rise to the phenomenon of their retreat from their old"p"osi-
tion. -This, however, is the re·start of their new and healthier 
development. It is contended. that no business depression 
was· registered by commercial banks in China before and 
after the China Incident. . The fact remains, however, that 
. I ' ' 
the real p()wer of those banks has been relatively on a de· 
.• crease .. This will also result .in the. elimination of thecondi-
tion which has proved an impediment to their improvement 
owing to their own inherent position. 
To.summarise: there has been the phenomenon of credit 
concel)tration in the Chinese banks, especially those in 
Shanghai, but capital has not been digested as it should have_ 
been. All this tells us. that not only the commercial banks 
should shift their function from the medium of deposit to 
that of loans but that all of their problems should be solved 
. by. their attaining the object of credit· creation. 
In this connection, it is necessary to make a survey on 
the character of the monetary market and capital market, 
not as a malformed phenomenon under the Cbina Incident, 
but as a matter relating to the backwardness of Chinese 
finance. Tbe China.Incident has rendered a fundamental read-
justment of their character a matter. of absolute importance. 
4. CONSOLIDATION OF THE BANKING 
FUNCTION· 
It is asserted that after the adoptio_n of the new currency 
policy by China, constructive economic programs became 
18) Recommendations on the Improvnient of FinanCial Business, Bank WeeklY. 
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possible in that country. This in regards to finance means 
its .advance from that existing malformed transition to the 
stage' of normal development. In other words, industry and 
finance must be made to form inseparable relations with 
each other .. The finance of a nation depends on the support 
given by industry,' while industrial development finds it 
outlet in the adjustment of finance. It is also maintained 
that Chinese finance should be made to advance not only to 
that degree where it can adjust the general financial transac· 
tions by means of individual credit, but also to that stage 
where it can bring about a considerable advance of the 
industrial world in general and thereby creating ground for 
the accomodation of capital. - The accomodation of capital 
should be directed -towards the establishment ofa credit 
system and assuring its healthy operation, so that the ad-
vancement of Chinese national economy may be promoted.'·), 
On thE! other hand, consideration should be given to the fact 
'. that:the increase of bank deposits h~s lost much of its 
sjgnificance because of two financial factors following' the 
. outbreak of the China Incident. These factors are: the 
replacement of fixed bank deposits by current bank deposits, 
the latter showing an increased rate of proportion over the 
former; and the existence of a large amount of currencies 
issuedincIuding the old fapi and the Central Reserve Bank 
notes, with their vast purchasing power.'OJ 
The role to be. played by wartime finance does not permit 
its ending in a paper plan only. Reciprocal relations between 
, - - . 
industry and finance make inevitable concentration of finan-
cial endeavours on some important plans such as providing 
war expenses - and expanding' production output.' Some of 
the missions of wartime finance are very wide in scope a~d 
require urgency in their administnition .. Peace-time financial 
19) A Bird's-Eye View' of'China$ Wartime',_Policy~ Economic R'esear~h, Vol. 
2, No.8, p. ZOo 
20) The Past and Present of the Chinese Commercial Banks, Bank Weekly, 
Vol. 27, No. 13-14, pp. 1-3. 
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measures demanded the Chinese banks to shift their business 
activities from receiving short-time fluid deposits-to accomo-
dating long-term fixed loans'. No alteration,. of" course, has 
been brought about in the character of the banks by war-
time finance, which demands stronger and more effective 
measures than hitherto. 
In considering the' adjustment of financial mechanism, 
capital should be distinguished into two forms, -namely, 
fixed capital and fluid capital, according to the length of the 
period during which it is employed_ Capital employed in 
construction objects wiII be long i,n service and will be 
distinguished from that which is employed for a short period 
of time .. Thus, the expansion of construction problems wiII 
be accompanied by' the· expansion of the fixation of capital. 
The market of ~hort-time capital is known as the money· 
market and corresponds to theso-calIed financial market. 
The market of long-term capital is popularly called the 
capital market:. In the case of China; with the progress of 
her, construction projects, demand for the capitaL market 
became stronger than that -for the money market. However, 
the real transition was far from sufficient. This fact is an 
instance of retarding the progress of construction projects 
in Chinese national economy. 
In the adjustment . of financial mechanism, distinction 
should be made between two forms of market, namely, the 
money market and the capital market. The money market 
takes up the movement of the short-time capital of industrial 
and commercial enterprises, while' the capital market takes 
up the long-term investments of fixed capital. Concretely 
. speaking, the main business activities of the market of short-
term capital ,c:onsist in short-time credit loans, discounting of 
bank-endorsed bills and commercial bills and making loans 
. in general.' In the case of China, however, although a con-
siderable progress is claimed to have been made in her credit 
loans, the circulation of her shorf-term capital has not 'yet 
attained such a state of development. As regards the long-
term capital market, financial activities such as loaning on 
, 
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security, the issuing of,and payment tm, government bonds, 
debentures and corporate stocks, as well as market opera-
tions for security transactions, should be taken into conside: 
ration. Now, the notable fact regardin'g government bonds 
in the case of China is that they have made a malformed 
development of their own and have failed to carry out their 
'inherent functions of thecapital market. Such being the 
character of these two markets, distinction should be also 
made of the character of the corresponding supply of capital 
for each of these markets. In other words, short-term 
capital tends to depend on created creciit, while long-term 
capital tends to depend on financial accumulations made by 
saving_ In the field of the mon~y market, capital has the, 
character of operating capital, while in' that of the ~apital ' 
, market, capital assumes'constructive char,acteristics.21)~, 
The above distinction between the money market as the 
short-t~rm capital market and the capital market as the long-
term capitaHnarket comes from the reasons already noted. 
'/', . 'hi.China, however, there is a view which ignores this dls-
. '::-'tinction. This idea is based upon the preconception that the 
, financial system of the West, particularly; Britain and' the 
United States is progressive, while that of China is backward 
in character. It is asserted that since ther~ exists' a clear 
line of demarkation between financial organs concerned and 
the source of capital in the Western nations, their mark~t 
is in a condition in which the above distinction is possible. 
It is further argued that jnthe case 'of China, her financial 
organization has not yet made a healthy development and 
the conditions of her commercial and industrial enterprises 
have not adequately made use of that organization, so that 
if is higp.ly difficult for its financial mecha~ism to receive 
the full support of the financial market. When the present 
conditions of the Chinese financial organization and realties 
in the Chinese industrial development are taken into consi-
deration, it is more consonant yv'lth facts in case, if no 
21) Yasuma ,Takada, Second Treatise on Economics, pp. 273.274. 
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" 
distinction is made between the money market and the capital 
market. It is concluded that for the Chinese' it is sufficient 
to continue their old system and make imp'rovements there-
~~ , ' 
In reply to the foregoing contention, if may be said that 
one cannot deny the necessity of a distinction between the, 
money and capital markets simply _because of the backward-
ness of Chinese financ~. ' The most that one can say is that 
it is difficult to make such a distinction between the two, 
markets. Long-term capital can justly be included in the use 
of shorJ-term capital, while the latter, in turn, can be included 
as far as possible in the use of the former. Under duress 
of the scarcity of. capital, even coercion is brought to bear 
upon the using of short-term capital as long-term capital. 
This qualitative change tends to eliminate the character of 
'certainty possessed by the two forms of capital, long and 
short, and gives rise to further consequences. Special atten-
tion should be paid to this point in a study of the Chinese 
financial mechanism."') 
The malformed transition of ordinary con;mercial banks 
in the existil)g Ch'inese banking system had to be -taken into 
considerati6n in respect to both short-term capita:l and' long-' 
term capital, and this has the effect of blurring the boundary 
line between these two forms of capital. Both those who_ 
supplied capital and those who demanded capital alike were 
accompanied by something vague which smoke-screened their 
existence, and neither short-term capital nor long-term capital 
was able to maintain its distinct field' of activities_' We can 
, see from the above fact why both the security market and 
the mechanism of brokerage which were to act as organs of 
promotion bet'h'een the suppliers and consumers of capital, 
inevitably possessed a character of speculation. 
I shall now consider the problems of improvements, to 
22) A Bird's-Eye View of China's Wartime Policy, Economic Reserch, Vol. 2, 
No_ 8, p. 20. , 
23) Chen Chia Tsun: Das chinesische Bankwesen, 1938, 55_ 98-99, 
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made on the business activities of the Chinese bankers- by 
centering my treatment on the problems of the Central Bank 
of China We have. already seen that the Chine~e commercial 
banks scored a business success in their unfavourable condi-
tion before and after the China Incident. The fact of the 
concentration of idle capital in Shanghai and the general 
trend of- speculative buyi~ and storing has been clear from 
the business conditions of banks_ The banks have been 
unable to absorb idle capital and offer it as construction 
funds_ This is partly due to the fact that there are some 
. things with regards to China's prevalent speculative buying 
and storing that make it impossible for one to regard them 
as mere acts of speculation. Meanwhile, the Chiness finan-
. ' cial organs have expanded their credit loans thereby losing 
their self-control. Coupled with the fact thatrhe bulk of 
bank deposits were current deposits, the volume of fixed 
deposits being a very negligible portion,the credit loaning 
by the banks .constituted a grave crisis for themselves. It is 
because. of this state of affairs that their exercise. of self-
control was greatly demanded. Demand for the replacement 
of cr~dit Ioans by loans with bills as. security has been also 
made from the same ground .. 
. Theprbblem of improving the methods of loans has 
renewed the problem 'of accepting bills. This gives rise to 
the increasiQi:{ importance of loans by the Central Reserve 
Bank of China .. It is -now proposed that a certain limitation 
. should' be placed on the amount of bank loans: It is ac- , 
com ponied by a difficult technical problem of exact mathema-
tical computation. The object of the propgsal is to replace 
credit loans by loans with security.") 
The central bank in any country today has the following 
- .' 
main activities: the concentration of issue reserves, the con-
centration of deposit reserves and the financial dispositon of 
. the national treasury. China has also shown a system ap-
24) The i;;'portance of Loans by the Central Reserve Bank of China, Central 
Economic Monthly. VoL 3, No, 2, pp. 4-5. 
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proaching to such a general mechanism in its transition. 
Like other central banks, the Cen~ral Bank of China also· 
carries on the bank rate policy and open market operation by 
using short-term and long-term capital, but China's case is 
more complicated than those in other countries.. In China, in 
order to bring about the. complete adjustment of the banking 
. system, the central bank should undertake the business of 
ordinary banks and transfer. it to them for actual purposes .. 
The Central Bank of China has the burden of bringing about 
such a state of business activities. The advanced nations can 
depend mainly upon their existing organs for their financial 
control by improving and utilizing them. It behooves the 
backward nations that they establish new organs and guide 
their activities for a similar purpose of control, in addition 
to their utilizing the existing organs. The establishment of 
a new financial mechanism and the opening up of a new 
field of financial endeavour are necessary. Although the 
ordinary commercial banks have continued their outward 
conditions, in reality they are faced by a basic circumstance I 
which is radically different from their former status and the 
. problem of their internal adjustment has become a matter of 
paramount importance . 
